COUP: What is happening in turkey?

25 May 2026

Let’s make a summary first and then go into details. On may 21st, the court, in accordance with the request of the uneducated erdoğan who is in office despite it being unconstitutional, issued a decision of ‘absolute nullity’ and carried out a COUP against the country’s largest and most deep-rooted Republican People’s Party (CHP). Before the court decision was finalized, on May 24th, hundreds of p*lice forcefully entered the party’s headquarters by breaking the doors and looting the belongings, and used live ammunition and tear gas bombs indoors. Moreover, the decision given by the court stated “…to the Supreme Election Council (YSK) for necessary action…”.

This means that, after the decision is finalized and registered by the YSK, the Mandate was required to be given to his coup partner kemal kılıçdaroğlu, who lost 13 elections and the Party congress which the court unlawfully canceled. The YSK remained passive against this unlawful decision and did not give the mandate. Furthermore, kemal kılıçdaroğlu requested the p*lice attack and declared himself the chairman, which is an illegitimate declaration. The Founding Party, which was last attacked and closed during the 1980 coup, is now de facto closed in the eyes of the public. According to the polls, the unpopularity rate of kemal kılıçdaroğlu, who was previously disliked by approximately %30 of the public mostly consisting of government supporters across the country, exceeded %80 in a single day.

The people showed their anger by declaring kemal kılıçdaroğlu a “TRAITOR”. The legitimate Chairman of the Party, Özgür ÖZEL, on the other hand, left the Party Headquarters on foot and went to the Parliament building to prevent a clash between the P*lice and the Public. However, despite doing absolutely nothing, an investigation with 3 separate charges was initiated against Özgür ÖZEL using this walk as an excuse. Apparently, in türkiye it is now forbidden even to walk from one place to another… türkiye is not just those historical buildings you see, this is what the real türkiye is like. No one has peace, neither life security nor legal security… All ways to restore these are being closed by this and similar unlawful decisions.

This dark picture is the most concrete proof that the crisis the country is in is not just a political dispute, but directly a state and regime crisis. The fact that the YSK remained passive and paved the way for lawlessness instead of fulfilling its constitutional duty shows the extent to which state institutions are paralyzed and have become partisan. There is a broken wheel that does not work despite the court’s decision to “take necessary action”, or rather, it only works in favor of the government and its illegitimate apparatuses. While kemal kılıçdaroğlu is trying to usurp the legitimacy he lost at the ballot box and in intra-party democracy with a p*lice shield and palace-supported judicial games, he has actually left an indelible black mark on his political history.

The reaction of the people to this tyranny should not be read as limited only to the internal dynamics of a party. The unpopularity rate exceeding %80 overnight is the biggest proof that the street and the voters never approved of this ugly theater. As millions of citizens watch their legitimate representatives, elected by their own votes, being eliminated by fabricated court decisions and open state violence, the last crumbs of faith in the ballot box and democracy are also being destroyed. Entering a building that is the fortress of the founding will with gas bombs is today’s post-modern reflection of the combat boot sounds of the 1980 coup.

On the other hand, the criminalization of even the walk to the parliament by Özgür ÖZEL, an elected Member of Parliament and CHP Chairman, who chose calm instead of escalating violence and provocation, reveals how much the government and its new partners fear even the slightest civil disobedience. The fact that an investigation with fabricated charges was initiated against him just because he walked shows that the freedom of assembly, expression, and even travel in türkiye is de facto suspended.

After turning the party headquarters into a ‘battlefield’, the p*lice….

As a result, türkiye has now turned into a geography where the lawlessness of the superiors rules, not the rule of law. Behind those magnificent landscapes in tourist brochures, lives a people whose institutions can have their doors broken at any moment, politicians who face the danger of being imprisoned for their peaceful actions, and a public whose most basic constitutional rights have been taken away. This climate of fear built with the stick of the judiciary mortgages not only today but also the future of the country, its social peace, and its reputation in the international arena in a way that is very difficult to reverse.

Open Source Intelligence and Verification Report: Fictional and Factual Analysis of the Cancellation of the CHP 38th Ordinary Convention, the Judicial Crisis, and the May 24, 2026 Eviction Operation

Introduction and Methodological Framework

To show that the events I described above are not just a personal comment, I present below the report I compiled on the judicial and de facto events that took place in may 2026, purely through open source data, official statements, legal decisions, and instant notifications of field reporters. This analysis, which I prepared with objective data, verifies and structures with forensic precision the “absolute nullity” decision given by the Ankara Regional Court of Justice (BAM) 36th Civil Chamber, the administrative stance of the YSK, the p*lice intervention on may 24, 2026, and the reflections of these events on political actors and the public.

As a result of the cross-verification of open source (OSINT) data, it has been determined that the crisis in question went beyond being a mere internal statute or convention dispute and evolved into a multi-layered state-opposition crisis involving the forceful intervention of law enforcement forces against the main opposition party’s headquarters, realized with the full participation of the administrative, judicial and security apparatuses of the state. This report aims to present this transformation in its chronological, legal and sociological dimensions.

1. Verification of the Judicial Process: Development and Rationale of the Absolute Nullity Decision

The 38th Ordinary Grand Convention dated November 4-5, 2023, where Özgür ÖZEL was elected chairman of the CHP, was taken to court by intra-party dissidents and some delegates. Open source data confirms that two diametrically opposed legal interpretations emerged between the first instance court stage and the appellate stage of the case.

1.1. Stance of the Court of First Instance

The lawsuits filed for the cancellation of the convention were primarily merged at the Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance. According to the case files, on October 24, 2025, the court decided to dismiss the case for some plaintiffs and ruled that there was no need to make a decision on the merits for other plaintiffs because it “became moot”. This decision was recorded as a step in line with classic legal jurisprudence, where first instance judicial authorities avoid direct intervention in the internal workings and democratic processes of political parties and foresee that intra-party disputes should be resolved on political grounds. Following the decision, the Özgür ÖZEL administration continued to protect its legitimacy and carried the party to the first party position in the 2024 local elections.

1.2. Intervention of the Appellate Court and the Concept of Absolute Nullity

After the decision of the first instance court, the file was taken to the Ankara Regional Court of Justice (BAM) 36th Civil Chamber via appeal. On may 21, 2026, the Chamber signed a precedent-setting decision, overturning the decision of the Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance and accepting the case, ruling that the convention was marred by “absolute nullity” (strict invalidity). Absolute nullity, a legal term, means that a legal transaction is considered to have never existed from the very beginning due to a deficiency in its constituent elements or a clear violation of public order and imperative legal rules.

In the reasoned decision reflected in open sources, the main basis for the court applying this severe sanction is the conclusion that “the will of the delegates at the convention was crippled due to various interests”. Minister of Justice Akın Gürlek confirmed this situation in his statement after the decision, stating that the judicial result was shaped entirely by the applications and testimonies of the CHP delegates, denying allegations of government intervention and using the expression “The crippling of the delegate’s will is unacceptable”. However, human rights lawyers and CHP officials argued that it was unusual for an appellate chamber to write and publish such a voluminous (20 pages) and complex decision in a single day; and, as stated in the claims of CHP Şanlıurfa Deputy Mahmut Tanal, they asserted that the decision was written in mid-April and kept on hold to be activated at the most politically convenient conjuncture.

1.3. Sanctions of the Decision and Legal Anomaly

The decision of the Ankara BAM 36th Civil Chamber was not just a declaratory judgment, it also brought very heavy executive sanctions. The operative provisions of the decision have been verified from open sources as follows:

Precautionary suspension of the current Chairman Özgür ÖZEL and the party administration (Party Assembly and Central Executive Board).
Temporary reinstatement of the former Chairman kemal kılıçdaroğlu and the party organs prior to the convention until the Supreme Court of Appeals process is completed.
Chain cancellation of not only the 38th Ordinary Grand Convention but also all ordinary and extraordinary conventions held after this convention, as well as sub-delegation processes such as the 38th Ordinary Istanbul Provincial Congress where Özgür Çelik was elected.

The picture created by this decision created a major anomaly in terms of political parties law. The removal of a current administration that received the votes of millions of voters and the appointment by court order of a former administration that lost the elections created a fierce conflict between the principle of democratic representation and judicial decisions.

Judicial Stage	Relevant Court/Board	Decision Date	Ruling and Justification
First Instance	Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance	October 24, 2025	No need to make a decision on the merits as the case became moot.
Appellate (Second Instance)	Ankara BAM 36th Civil Chamber	may 21, 2026	Cancellation of the first instance decision. Absolute nullity of the convention on the grounds that the delegate’s will was crippled.
Objection to Precautionary Injunction	Ankara BAM 36th Civil Chamber	Post-Decision	Unanimous rejection of the objection to the precautionary injunction on the grounds that the avenue for appeal is closed.

2. Legal Defense Strategies of the CHP and the Stance of the Supreme Election Council

Following the announcement of the absolute nullity decision, the CHP Central Executive Board (MYK) held an extraordinary meeting in Ankara under the chairmanship of Chairman Özgür ÖZEL and made an evaluation that lasted for about five hours. After this meeting, Özgür ÖZEL declared that the party would use its right of legitimate defense on the judicial plane, and announced to the public that the appeal file, which also included the request for the removal of the precautionary injunction, was submitted to the Supreme Court of Appeals and its fee was deposited.

2.1. Supreme Court Application and Legal Chaos

In the appeal petition submitted by the CHP, it was argued that bringing names other than the elected persons to the party administration for an indefinite period of time by the court is against the Constitution, democratic rule of law principles, and the party’s right to conduct political activities. However, during this process, a “legal sabotage” attempt regarding the party’s representation authority also took place. Open source documents show that some people who do not represent the party’s will, requested the lifting of the precautionary injunction with a hasty and malicious attitude, without the instruction, knowledge, and consent of the current administration (Özgür ÖZEL).

When this situation was noticed, the official lawyers of the CHP submitted a new petition stating that the previous unauthorized application was incompatible with the party’s current legal strategy and true will, and informed the court that they had withdrawn this request. However, the Ankara BAM 36th Civil Chamber unanimously rejected the CHP’s objection to the measure on the grounds that a decision on the merits had been made and that the avenue for appeal/objection against the precautionary injunction decisions given by the appellate court within the systematics of the Code of Civil Procedure (HMK) is closed. This rejection decision legally eliminated the possibility of the Özgür ÖZEL administration being quickly reinstated.

2.2. The YSK’s “Lack of Jurisdiction” Decision

After this blockage in civil judiciary, the CHP applied to the YSK, the highest authority of election law. Özgür ÖZEL demanded that the council protect the mandates, saying, “There is election law, there are objection periods. The interference of other courts in these matters outside of election law is to ignore the YSK.” CHP’s YSK Representative Mehmet Hadimi Yakupoğlu also emphasized that the court decision is “materially and legally inapplicable”. The party’s clear request from the YSK was to “decide on the determination that the mandates are valid and those elected continue their duties” despite the court decision.

However, the YSK rejected this request on may 22, 2026, after a meeting that lasted for about two hours. YSK Chairman Serdar Mutta stated in a statement made to the cameras that the board could not make an evaluation regarding the absolute nullity decision and the precautionary injunction sent from the Ankara BAM. Mutta’s legal justification is extremely clear: The YSK has no duty and authority regarding the execution of the decisions of civil courts. Accordingly, it was unanimously decided to return the letter sent from the court to its origin without any action taken. This stance of the YSK left the gray area between civil court decisions and administrative election mechanisms in favor of the government and civil judiciary, depriving the CHP administration of administrative protection.

3. Physical Dimension of the Eviction Crisis: May 24, 2026 P*lice Operation

The exhaustion of legal remedies and the appellate court’s precautionary injunction decision remaining in effect moved the crisis from paper to physical space. The fact that the lawyer of the former Chairman kemal kılıçdaroğlu, Celal Çelik, applied to the Ankara Governorship requesting the eviction of the CHP Headquarters and its delivery to them prepared the ground for the direct intervention of the state’s security apparatuses in the main opposition party. Upon this application, the Ankara Governorship gave an eviction instruction to the Ankara Provincial P*lice Department.

Following this instruction, the date of May 24, 2026 went down in türkiyes political history as a rare law enforcement-political party conflict. The anatomy of the eviction process, which I compiled second by second, is presented below:

3.1. Escalating Tension at Midnight and Morning Hours

Following the appellate court’s absolute nullity decision, the mobility in the headquarters building showed a dramatic increase starting from midnight connecting may 23 to May 24. While the Ankara P*lice Department significantly increased the number of p*lice around the headquarters, CHP administrators created a civil defense line and barricade by pulling party buses to the courtyard entrances of the headquarters. All CHP deputies and party administrators other than those on duty came to the headquarters with an emergency code and started waiting, and the entrances and exits to the building were completely blocked with civilian vehicles.

At 08:49 in the morning, CHP Deputy Group Chairman Murat Emir announced in a statement made in front of the headquarters that communication was established between Özgür ÖZEL and kemal kılıçdaroğlu the previous evening and that delegations of two people agreed to meet at noon to determine the convention date. However, Emir claimed that this reconciliation process was sabotaged by “mafia-like types they found somewhere”. During these hours, it was confirmed that a group of civilians supporting kılıçdaroğlu marched to the party building demanding the doors be opened, and a scuffle broke out between them and the group inside.

3.2. Collapse of Political Negotiations

By noon, the tension reached its peak. At 13:15, Murat Emir stated that those inside were trying to maintain their calm. Around 14:15, CHP deputies Murat Emir and Suat Özçağdaş held an official meeting with Minister of Interior Mustafa Çiftçi for the resolution of the crisis. During the negotiations, the CHP delegation informed the Minister that the execution request was attempted to be carried out in violation of procedures, that lawyers were not even allowed to examine the files, and that direct pressure was applied to break the door and enter. Emir described the situation as a “futile loss of energy”, stating that the Minister of Interior was also not pleased with the developments, that he was in favor of resolving the process calmly but had to execute the eviction “due to his duties”.

Müslim Sarı from the kılıçdaroğlu front stated in a statement made around the same time that they would wait for cooperation and compromise, and that kılıçdaroğlu would not agree to enter the building accompanied by the p*lice. However, political negotiations and efforts for compromise were not enough to stop the functioning of the security bureaucracy. In line with the order of the Ankara Governorship, p*lice teams began preparations for physical intervention after attempts to negotiate with party members proved inconclusive.

3.3. Forceful Intervention of Law Enforcement Forces and Internal Resistance

As confirmed by open sources, the operation de facto started as of 14:50.

P*lice teams first knocked down the iron garden gate to overcome the obstacles and enter the party courtyard. At this time, party members in the headquarters courtyard showed resistance by throwing water and glass bottles at the p*lice, while riot p*lice teams responded to the crowd with water cannons, intense tear gas, and gas capsules. After the security forces completely cleared the courtyard, they headed for the headquarters building.

Video sources confirmed that at 14:52, party members and deputies inside the building went to the windows and chanted slogans “Trustees will go, we will stay” against the p*lice intervention. As of 14:54, the p*lice intervened against journalists trying to take footage in front of the building, removed them from the area, and restricted the media visibility of the operation.

The scale of the resistance inside the building was extremely fierce. It was determined that there were party members affected by the gas, physical barricades were built from armchairs at the doors, and cleaning materials such as detergent were poured on the stairs to create a slippery effect to prevent the p*lice from climbing to the upper floors. Riot p*lice teams broke through the established barricades and evacuated the floors one by one, forcing everyone out of the building, including deputies and party administrators. As of 15:10, the building completely passed under p*lice control, many deputies and party members were thrown out, and the eviction process was completed. After the eviction, close aides of kemal kılıçdaroğlu entered the building to assess the damage, cleaning works were initiated, and photographs belonging to Özgür ÖZEL were taken down from the walls. On the other hand, it was also reflected in open sources that during the tension inside, photographs of kılıçdaroğlu in the headquarters were taken down and torn to pieces by the angry crowds.

Time (May 24, 2026)	Verified Stage of the Event	Relevant Open Source / Finding
08:49	Statement of Murat Emir: Negotiation attempts and intervention of civilian groups.	Signal of the collapse of political negotiations.
14:15	Meeting of the CHP Delegation with Minister of Interior Mustafa Çiftçi.	Exhaustion of political bureaucracy channels.
14:50	The p*lice breaking down the iron gates and entering the courtyard with tear gas and TOMA (water cannon).	Beginning of the physical intervention.
14:52	Party members chanting “Trustees will go” slogans from the windows.	Visual confirmation of internal resistance.
14:54	Journalists being removed from the area by p*lice force.	Isolation of the operation.
15:10	Forceful removal of deputies and administrators from the building; breaching of barricades.	De facto completion of the eviction.
15:40	Özgür ÖZEL making a press statement in front of the building after the eviction.	ÖZEL’s declaration of institutional resistance.

4. Discourse Analysis: Intra-Party Rupture and Positions of Political Actors

Statements obtained from open sources show that the absolute nullity decision and the subsequent p*lice raid caused an extremely difficult psychological and political rupture within the Republican People’s Party to repair.

4.1. Özgür ÖZEL Front: “Father’s Hearth”, “Trustee” and “Coup” Discourse

Özgür ÖZEL, who stood in front of the cameras outside the building after being evicted, described the situation not merely as a legal eviction, but as a “surgical operation on politics” and a “coup attempt” carried out by the judiciary. Using his harshest words yet directed at kılıçdaroğlu, ÖZEL stated, “Everyone does what suits them. We do what suits the CHP. I am very sad, but we are setting out to take back our father’s hearth. The next time we come here, this government and its collaborators will not dare to do this.” ÖZEL’s definition of the CHP headquarters as the “father’s hearth” aims to reinforce the feeling that institutional belonging and emotional heritage have been usurped.

The language of other officials in the ÖZEL wing became much harsher. Deputy Chairman Burhanettin Bulut pointed out the weakness or intentional inaction of the security forces, stating that in the absence of the p*lice, “mafia-looking” people raided the party and showed off. Similarly, Deputy Ali Mahir Başarır used the term “dealer-looking, mafia-looking unidentified armed people” for the civilian groups that came to the headquarters and expressed his anger by cursing those who led to the process saying, “Shame on you. May God damn them!”. Mahmut Tanal directly addressed kılıçdaroğlu, warning of the risk of civil war with the words: “Withdraw your mafia remnants that you sent to the headquarters. They are trying to make brother kill brother.” These discourses confirm that the ÖZEL front reads the court decision not as a legal document, but as an occupation movement carried out in cooperation with dark paramilitary forces and a corrupt judiciary.

The words ÖZEL uttered during the visit of İYİ Party Chairman Müsavat Dervişoğlu, “I do not accept anyone who does not get their power from the nation as a political interlocutor. I do not accept the appointed one,” are a clear declaration that he completely rejects the democratic legitimacy of kılıçdaroğlu and considers the authority he obtained by court force as illegitimate (“appointed”).

4.2. kemal kılıçdaroğlu Front: Struggle for Legitimacy and Prevention of Civil Resistance

Close aides of kemal kılıçdaroğlu developed a defensive discourse against the “occupation” and “treason” accusations of the ÖZEL front. Müslim Sarı stated that kılıçdaroğlu was aware of the events, that he favored a solution in accordance with democratic principles and in peace, and stated that there was no need to go to the Ministry of Interior. However, Sarı and other deputies supporting kılıçdaroğlu were physically prevented from entering the party building by deputies loyal to ÖZEL.

The kılıçdaroğlu wing showed a tendency to interpret the prevention of the implementation of the court decision as lawlessness. Despite Mahir Polat’s promise that the convention would be held as soon as possible, his description of the resistance of the ÖZEL administration as “a stubbornness we cannot understand” is a pragmatic stance that defends shifting legitimacy from the ballot box to the court decision. However, the fact that the crowd waiting outside the headquarters focusing on Özgür ÖZEL, unions, and leftist structures constantly chanted “Traitor Kemal” slogans shows the depth of kılıçdaroğlu’s legitimacy crisis at the base. In addition, the arrival of former CHP heavyweights Murat Karayalçın and Önder Sav to the headquarters to stand by Özgür ÖZEL, and Sav climbing on the election bus to address the crowd, is a critical open source finding confirming that kılıçdaroğlu is isolated in the eyes of the party elite and the old bureaucracy as well.

5. Post-Eviction Actions and Politicization of Judicial Investigations

Özgür ÖZEL, deputies, party administrators and tens of thousands of citizens who were evicted from the headquarters building by p*lice force carried out a massive protest march lasting 7 kilometers from the CHP Headquarters towards the TBMM (Parliament). This march, carried out with the slogan “The ballot box will come, nullity will go”, symbolized the party transforming into a civil resistance movement beyond its institutional boundaries. ÖZEL announced that the struggle evolved into a new phase by adding the note “Today is a milestone. Today has a before. It will have an after…” to the photos he shared from the march on his social media account.

After the march that ended in the TBMM park, ÖZEL held a closed-door group meeting with deputies, provincial chairmen, and party members in the parliament. In this meeting, it was stated that the most urgent demand of the base was to go to a convention as soon as possible. Making a statement after the meeting, ÖZEL said, “CHP is not a place that can be obtained by political snatching,” and formulated his strategy of taking legitimacy to the streets with the words “CHP is now in the squares.”

However, this protesting dimension of democratic politics was immediately criminalized by the state’s judicial mechanisms. The Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office launched a comprehensive investigation into the events that started in front of the Headquarters on may 24 and extended to the parliament. The charges brought within the scope of the investigation have been verified from open sources as follows:

‘Violation of the Law on Meetings and Demonstration Marches No. 2911’: Holding unauthorized meetings and causing riots.
‘Resisting an officer on duty’: Violent acts against law enforcement forces, setting up barricades and showing resistance.
‘Intentional injury’: In the context of physical clashes during the eviction and the march.
Vehicular Attack Investigation: A separate intentional injury investigation initiated based on footage of a vehicle hitting a woman and driving away during the scuffle in front of the headquarters.

The fact that the marching of the leader of the main opposition party and deputies to the legislative body where they personally serve is made the subject of a criminal charge is empirical data showing how the boundaries of the right to engage in politics in türkiye are narrowed by the judiciary and how the law is transformed into a tool of oppression to eliminate the opposition.

6. Political and Social Reflections: Juristocracy Debates and International Perception

6.1. Solidarity of the Opposition Bloc and “Juristocracy”

The support visit paid by İYİ Party Chairman Müsavat Dervişoğlu to Özgür ÖZEL immediately after the crisis confirms that the opposition perceives this move as a systemic threat. Dervişoğlu stated that the processes were not “ordinary affairs and actions” and defined the decision with the concept of “Juristocracy” (oligarchy of judges). According to Dervişoğlu, this situation is the danger of invalidating the will of the people and political decisions through the judicial mechanism. Saying, “A trustee for a 100-year-old party is an absurdity,” Dervişoğlu described the solidarity between him and ÖZEL as a “law of brotherhood” and openly declared that he stands by democracy and the national will.

Similarly, CHP metropolitan and district mayors in istanbul defined the process as an engineering effort aimed at dividing the party, called for an extraordinary convention within 45 days, and gave full support to the ÖZEL administration. These reactions are civil defense lines built against the government’s attempt to design the opposition through the judiciary, ideologically supporting ÖZEL’s statement, “We will not be the acceptable opposition party of the established order.”

6.2. Public Perception and Voter Sociology

Field data and public opinion polls show that this intervention by the government through the judiciary created a broad legitimacy crisis in society. According to survey data reflected in open sources, it has been determined that the people showed great resistance to the “absolute nullity and eviction decision against the CHP”. The most striking data in terms of analysis is that this external political intervention divided even the AKP and MHP voters who make up the government bloc in half. Interfering in the internal workings of a political party with security forces and heavy judicial decisions was not considered fair even in the eyes of traditional statist/right-wing voters; concern about the politicization of the judiciary spread to the social base.

6.3. Reports of International Press and Human Rights Organizations

Open source scans show that the concept of “absolute nullity” crossed Turkish borders and entered the international human rights literature as a new phase of authoritarianism.

International news agencies and the world press reported this decision as a “new threshold” crossed by President erdoğan in cracking down on his political rivals and putting pressure on the opposition. Human Rights Watch (HRW), in its published assessment, read this change of administration carried out by the judiciary and the p*lice intervention as part of the government’s strategy aimed at putting the political opposition out of play. HRW characterized the decision as a “heavy blow” to the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, and warned that President erdoğan is systematically deepening his attacks on political rights.

7. Future Projections and Institutional Survivals

In light of the data collected as of may 2026, several possible scenarios emerge for the resolution of the crisis faced by the CHP:

De Facto Conflict and Alternative Organization (Ground Zero): The statements of the Özgür ÖZEL administration, “CHP is not a place to be obtained by snatching” and “We are now in the squares,” indicate that the party will continue its existence on the street and in alternative spaces, without being confined to headquarters buildings and court decisions. The fact that the vast majority of ÖZEL’s staff and delegation stand on this front may cause kılıçdaroğlu to turn into a chairman “who has a signboard but no base.” Even the possibility of the Özgür ÖZEL faction entering the election under the umbrella of a new party in the upcoming period is discussed with “backup party” discourses.
kemal kılıçdaroğlu Going to the Convention Under the Legal Legitimacy Crisis: As stated by names like Mahir Polat, kılıçdaroğlu may quickly take the party to a convention and try to re-test his legitimacy at the ballot box. However, the “Traitor Kemal” slogans of thousands of people gathered in front of the headquarters and the delegation’s loyalty to ÖZEL make it almost impossible for kılıçdaroğlu to emerge victorious from such a convention. This situation justifies interpreting the absolute nullity decision as the government’s move to deepen the fault lines within the CHP.
Possibility of Early/Snap Election: One of the most strategic risks of the crisis is the “snap election” scenario voiced by political scientists. If the government bloc takes an early election decision within six months, the CHP will not be able to complete the convention process and will be legally forced to enter the elections under the leadership of kılıçdaroğlu, with fragmented organizations and the perception of an appointed trustee. The thesis that the real goal of the judicial operation is to paralyze the main opposition party and guarantee a possible early election in favor of the government is one of the strongest analytical conclusions consistent with OSINT data.

8. Conclusion

As a result of the chronological and thematic confirmation of the data obtained from open sources; it has been verified that the “absolute nullity” decision given by the Ankara Regional Court of Justice 36th Civil Chamber against the 38th Ordinary Convention of the Republican People’s Party and the eviction operation carried out by security forces on May 24, 2026 for its execution, is an act of political engineering that deeply shakes the democratic constitutional order of türkiye.

The expansion of a dispute rejected by the court of first instance at the appellate level with an extremely open-to-interpretation justification such as “crippling of the delegate’s will”, in a way that removes the legitimate party administration that received millions of votes and reinstates the old administration, is the most concrete example of the law transforming into a tool for designing politics. The fact that the YSK did not provide administrative protection against this intervention on the grounds that it has no authority to review civil court decisions clearly shows how judicial power is consolidated in favor of the government bloc.

On the physical level, the state breaking down the iron doors of the main opposition party with water cannons, tear gas and riot p*lice teams and throwing the chairman and deputies out of the building went down in political history as an operation carried out against the “father’s hearth”. The CHP’s response to this external operation by marching to the parliament and taking the resistance to the squares confirms that the political struggle is moving out of the institutional-judicial ground and onto the ground of mass civil disobedience. This picture, which is fixed with open source data, proves beyond doubt that not only the institutional integrity of the CHP, but also the right to elect and be elected, the freedom of political parties and the principle of an independent judiciary are under heavy destruction in türkiye.